Cultural Differences and the Importance of Trust Between Volcanologists and Partners in Volcanic Risk Mitigation by unknown
Cultural Differences
and the Importance of Trust Between
Volcanologists and Partners
in Volcanic Risk Mitigation
Chris Newhall
Abstract
A challenge in volcanic hazards communication is to bridge the cultural and
language gaps between volcanologists and those who use volcanological
information. We might be nominally from a single culture, e.g., Japanese,
American, Italian, etc., but the cultural gaps between volcanologists and
those who use volcano information can be as wide or wider than those from
one country to the next. We have different goals or agendas, different
approaches to solving problems, different terminologies, different deﬁni-
tions of success, and different reward systems. The ﬁrst step toward bridging
gaps is to recognize and accept the differences—valuing each other’s goals
and agreeing to work as a team to satisfy both. This acceptance plus
involving information users in the information gathering helps to build trust.
Without such trust, players are unlikely to accept each other’s advice.
Mainly from personal experience, I note commonly encountered cultural
differences. Then, given the cultural differences, I note the critical
importance of bridging those differences with trust. Finally, I give three
short case histories—fromMount St. Helens, Pinatubo, and Usu—in which
trust was built and differences were successfully overcome.
1 Introduction
At Mount St. Helens in 1980, Cowlitz County
Sheriff Les Nelson once lamented: “Trying to get
a straight answer from a geologist is like trying
to corner a rat in a round house.”
Geologists were not trying to hide anything,
but they knew that Mount St. Helens could show
a variety of behavior so they couched their
answers in the kind of caveats that all scientists
are taught to use. “There are several possible
scenarios…” “Uncertainties are high…” and
similar. Sheriff Nelson, and others, wanted sim-
pler answers: yes, no, or, at least, most likely,
probably yes, probably not, or similar.
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It is easy to imagine additional words that might
be said about volcanologists, to their face or behind
their backs. Here are some that I can imagine:
Volcanologists are a strange lot … Some of them
hike up and down volcanoes, digging in the dirt or
whacking off pieces of rock and telling us that they
know how this volcano works. Others go around
planting sensors in the ground, or snifﬁng the
gases, and tell us they know how this volcano
works. Sometimes they agree, often they don’t.
We’re told there are still others who spend all their
time heating and squeezing rocks in their labora-
tories, or writing computer programs they say
simulate real life volcanoes. They publish papers
in scientiﬁc journals that only they can read, and
consider their work done. If we ask them “Is it
dangerous?” their answers are so ambiguous that
we might do just as well with a pair of dice. Do
they think we care about what will happen in the
next thousand years? And if we ask them “What
should we do?” they answer “Ask someone else.
That’s not our mandate or expertise!
Just as easily, I can imagine words of volca-
nologists about ofﬁcials and other non-scientists:
Ofﬁcials and the public are a strange lot. They
think that if we are good scientists, we should
know exactly when and how each volcano will
erupt. If we explain how complicated volcanoes
are, and how science focuses on what isn’t known,
they roll their eyes in disbelief. Why, some of them
even want us to give them 24-hour warnings! We
aren’t like seers who can divine the future! If we
talk about the different ways that a volcano can kill
them, they say “We don’t care HOW we might get
killed – just if or when. For us, a bomb falling on
our head is the same as being toasted front or
back.” If we offer probabilities of various scenar-
ios, they don’t understand. And they keep resisting
us… saying they want to stay in their homes, or on
their jobs, or protect their cows. How can they
expect us to keep them safe if they themselves
won’t take precautions?
Everyone who has travelled or worked in
another culture knows that there are signiﬁcant
differences in values and customs from one cul-
ture to the next. This paper is a short
cross-cultural look at differences within single
cultures, just between scientists and those who
use scientiﬁc information.
2 The Literature of Scientific
Communication
Many books have been written about scientiﬁc
communication, and how to bridge between the
worlds of science and everyday life. Many
excellent tips are given by Hayes and Grossman
(2006), Manning (2006), Dean (2009), Olson
(2009), Kennedy and Overholser (2010), Bulti-
tude (2011), Fischhoff (2011), Graveline (2013),
and other references in The Earth Institute
(2014). Broad concepts of credibility and trust in
risk communication are discussed by Renn and
Levine (1991). Ways by which scientiﬁc uncer-
tainty can be communicated in ways that enhance
scientists’ credibility are discussed by Morgan
and Henrion (1990), Morgan (1998), Moss
(2011), Mastrandrea et al. (2010), Pidgeon and
Fischhoff (2011), and Socolow (2011). Ways by
which scientists can communicate well across
disciplines are discussed by Harris and Lyon
(2013), among others. The present paper does not
pretend to review the available literature, much
less be a scholarly treatise. Rather, it presents
personal experiences, which can be put by others
into more general lessons of how best to com-
municate across professions.
3 Cultural Differences Among
Players at Volcanoes?
Here are six cultural differences between scien-
tists and non-scientists, as noticed during vol-
canic crises and as seen through my eyes as a
volcanologist. By the generic term “scientist” I
refer to both physical and social scientists,
though my personal focus is naturally in physical
science, speciﬁcally in volcanology. Some of you
will correctly note stereotyping and sweeping
generalizations, made in the interest of brevity.
But every user group is a body of individuals.
Generalizations will not apply to all, but in my
experience they do apply to many!
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First, we are concerned with different prob-
lems. Scientists ask “What, when, how, and
especially, WHY?” Civil defence ofﬁcials and
land managers are concerned with “What, when,
how serious, and what can we do to keep people
safe?” Engineers ask “What is the problem and
what can we build to ﬁx it?” Politicians ask “How
can we balance many competing interests (and be
re-elected)?” News media ask “How can we
translate and convey this in interesting ways?”
And citizens ask, “What should my family do?”
None of these are easy questions or tasks!
Second, scientists and non-scientists have
different goals and reward systems. Everyone
shares the common goals of public safety and
well-being, doing one’s job well, and advancing
one’s career and pay scale. In addition, differing
goals include, for research scientists, to satisfy
intense curiosity and to have fun in doing so.Much
of the reward for scientists is the simple satisfac-
tion of making new discoveries. However, these
days, scientists must also compete with peers for
professional recognition, including metrics of
academic achievement. Those at universities and
research-oriented volcano observatories get
rewarded primarily for their research publications
or contributions to such publications, how often
their publications are cited by other scientists, and
their success in garnering research grants. Scien-
tists at public-service oriented organizations may
be rewarded primarily for smooth operations and
providing high quality advice to those who seek it.
Career public servants such as civil defence
ofﬁcials or land managers typically get rewarded
for protecting the lives, infrastructure, property,
economies, natural resources, and well-being of
communities. Local ofﬁcers will be rewarded for
answering directly to people of the community
while ofﬁcers at higher levels of government may
be rewarded for aiding the development of policy
and/or funding prospects for the organization.
Politicians seek a variety of rewards. They seek
re-election, yes, and funds for re-election, but
also the satisfaction of successfully balancing
between competing interests. A common
requirement in times of volcanic crises is to
successfully guard the safety of their constituents
yet, at the same time, help them continue their
lives as normally as possible, and to minimize
disruption of business. Engineers are typically
tasked with designing and implementing struc-
tural measures to reduce risk, and are rewarded
with contracts, positive evaluations, and promo-
tions if the project is successful. Most engineers
take great pride in what they build or ﬁx, so some
of their reward is also internal. The owners of
news media are driven variously by commitment
to inform and serve the public and by the proﬁt
motive. News reporters are driven by similar
commitment to public service, but are rewarded
for column inches or minutes of airtime and
editorial, peer, and public recognition.
Citizens, the most diverse group of all, need to
balance keeping their families safe from the
volcano and safe from other threats, including
loss of crops, jobs, income, schooling, friends
and social support networks, and other pillars of
daily life.
Third, we speak different languages. Every
ﬁeld has its own specialized jargon. The jargon
of scientists is a shorthand that is generally
understood ONLY by scientists. Volcanological
terms for major hazards like pyroclastic flows,
tephra fall, and lahars all need clear deﬁnition,
ideally in videos; more technical terms like
magma compositions, extrusion rates, earthquake
types, or monitoring technologies are best
reserved for audiences who will appreciate them.
Similarly, social science has its own jargon.
Engineering also has a specialized vocabu-
lary, though more widely used and understood
than that of scientists. Civil defence ofﬁcials have
their own jargon and acronyms, mostly
non-technical but equally baffling to scientists.
News media and the public use the language of
everyday life.
The ways we view and draw the world are
also different. Historically, geoscientists used
maps and cross-sections to visualize the world in
three dimensions, though increasingly those can
be combined into fancy 3D graphics. Traditional
maps (in plan view) and cross-sections are ﬁne
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for geoscientists and engineers, but too abstract
for most others (Haynes et al. 2007). Modern 3D
visualizations, including oblique aerial views, are
much better. GIS technology and the ready
availability of 3D visualization tools through
local-host GIS, Google Earth, Bing Maps, and
other services are wonderful tools to help geo-
scientists communicate with non-geoscientists.
The meanings we attach to adjectives and
other descriptors may be very different. Geolo-
gists have a very long view of time, far longer
than of interest to most who seek advice. “Soon”
to a layman might mean tomorrow while “soon”
to a geologist might mean 100 years from now!
Fast or slow are in the same category. The terms
high and low, and possible, probable, likely and
unlikely are notoriously ambiguous. Social sci-
entists and others have documented wide ranges
of numeric probabilities that different people
attach to the same terms (Morgan 1998; Mas-
trandrea et al. 2010). Doyle and Potter (2015)
recently suggested a table that translates from
adjectives to probabilities of geologic hazards. In
my own experience, the best ways to avoid the
ambiguity of adjectives is to deﬁne them quan-
titatively, as in Mastrandrea et al. (2010) and
Doyle and Potter (2015), or avoid them entirely
by using a ladder of comparable risks as dis-
cussed later in this paper.
Fourth, we have different approaches to
solving problems. In the scientiﬁc method, sci-
entists identify a problem, propose hypotheses,
gather data, and test the hypotheses (including
forecasts of the future). Typically, the data
gathering and interpretation involves a strong
emphasis on observational skills, measurement,
and quantitative assessment. Indeed, scientists
like to quantify everything, including hazard and
risk. Non-scientists (except engineers and a few
others) are often wary of numbers, either because
they don’t understand them or they don’t trust
them. In an exception, those making policy for
climate adaptation reportedly prefer numbers to
qualitative descriptors (Moss 2011).
Scientists also strive for very low levels of
uncertainty, such as might be acceptable for
publication in peer-reviewed journals. Notwith-
standing pressures to publish several papers per
year or meet deadlines for project funding, sci-
entists pride themselves in taking as much time as
is needed before they offer advice, often months
or years. Often, scientists resist calls to provide
quick advice; at the same time, they should rec-
ognize that some decisions simply must be made
quickly.
In contrast, Civil Defence leaders and land
managers identify the problem, consider alter-
native solutions, prepare a decision matrix (e.g.,
cost beneﬁt, etc.), and then make the optimal
decision, sometimes within just hours or days.
These decision-makers typically have higher
tolerance than scientists for uncertainty, though
in very high-stakes decisions such as siting of a
nuclear facility, they too will pay great attention
to uncertainty. Politicians follow a similar
approach, though with more attention to public
opinion. Accordingly, the metrics and weightings
may be different. Scientiﬁc facts and advice may
be just a small part of a political decision. For
example, on matters of hazards and risk, scien-
tists can evaluate hazard (and sometimes risk),
but it is inevitably a political matter to evaluate
how much risk the public (and the politician) is
willing to accept. Decisions about acceptable
risk, in turn, depend on the trade-offs between the
beneﬁts of taking the risk versus the potential
losses if one takes the risk and loses. Scientiﬁc
probabilities play a role, but only alongside many
other factors. The role of citizens is to tell
politicians and other decision makers how much
risk they are willing to tolerate, and/or to ‘vote
with their feet’ by self-evacuating if they so
decide.
Engineers deﬁne the problem as best as they
can in the time available, then design and
implement a solution. The process may include
consideration of several different designs and
eventually choosing one. Sometimes, engineers
express frustration with scientists if the starting
or input parameters for what they are supposed to
design keep changing. At some point, an engi-
neer must lock in a design, whereas scientists
keep on gathering data and, in some cases, call
for a different or more flexible design. Scientists
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expect Nature and people to change; engineers
may also expect change, but for their design they
need a snapshot in time. Scientists emphasize
uncertainty; engineers typically include a factor
of safety to account for uncertainty and are ready
to move on. News media generally limit them-
selves to reporting on how others solve prob-
lems, though some opinion or editorial pieces
and some committed local reporters will actively
facilitate communication between scientists,
engineers, decision makers and the public.
Members of the media bring special expertise in
interviewing, listening, and comparing various
points of view or approaches to problem solving.
Fifth, we differ in how we know what we
know (epistemology). Nearly all who want to
learn about a topic—scientists and non-scientists
alike—start with published knowledge. The pri-
mary knowledge might be in academic journals,
or in more accessible forms like books, popular
magazines, Wikipedia and other sources on the
internet, documentary videos, public lectures,
and the like. While most of what is published is
correct, all of us who publish know that there is
misleading information too. The “library”—
sensu latu—is a great place to start, but must be
read with a critical mind.
Most physical scientists believe that the world
operates according to well-known physical laws
and that most everything can be explained in
terms of physics and chemistry. I am among
them. We have strong faith in the scientiﬁc
method, observing, testing multiple hypotheses,
and throwing them out in order until we accept
the surviving hypothesis (or few). Scientists are
always studying the world, learning, and dis-
covering. We accept that the process should
involve high levels of self-critique and peer
review. We should be glad to disprove our own
hypotheses or have our hypotheses be disproven,
as that invariably leads to formulation of better
hypotheses and brings us closer to the truth.
Jasanoff (1996) and Bäckstrand (2003)
describe civic science: participatory, democratic,
and addressing often-controversial societal
problems without simple right or wrong answers,
and with meaning derived from both absolute
knowledge and human context. Civic science
stands in contrast to conventional academic sci-
ence that seeks to prove or disprove hypotheses,
creating “absolute” knowledge within the scien-
tiﬁc community that may or may not be used by
decision makers, and that almost never involves
citizens. On controversial matters involving big
business, civic science also stands in contrast to
science which promotes corporate interests. Most
scientists are trained for conventional academic
science, and can easily enter the proprietary
world of corporate science. Those who will join
in civic science must expect greater democracy
and relativism than in standard university
training.
What does civic science have to do with nat-
ural hazards? After all, aren’t natural hazards
wholly apolitical? No, decisions must still be
made, sometimes even controversial decisions,
and the more transparent and democratic the
scientiﬁc process, the more trust will be estab-
lished. One excellent example of civic vol-
canology is the network of vigías around
Tungurahua Volcano in Ecuador, where an early
overestimation of hazard created distrust of vol-
canologists that had to eventually be reversed,
and an important part of that reversal was
inclusion of local residents as scientiﬁc observers
and alerters (Stone et al. 2014).
Where decision makers and engineers do rely
on scientists for information on hazards and risk,
there comes a serious responsibility for those
scientists to resolve normal differences of inter-
pretation. Scientiﬁc teams must try to resolve
scientiﬁc debates and then present a consensus
view to decision makers. If some issues cannot
yet be resolved, it is ﬁne to present them as
competing hypotheses and explain how we will
try to test them [from the ﬁeld of climate change,
see advice by Socolow (2011)]. Scientiﬁc credi-
bility will still be intact. But if several different
scientists offer competing advice, decision mak-
ers must decide who to believe. Personalities and
trust, as much or more than evidence, become
deciding factors. If scientiﬁc debate still rages in
public, ofﬁcials will lose faith in all scientists.
Many citizens “learn” by trusting a charis-
matic public ﬁgure—be it a politician, a cleric, a
media ﬁgure, or anyone else. Sometimes, a
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scientist with unusually good communication
skills and a knack for simplifying and popular-
izing scientiﬁc concepts can be the charismatic
ﬁgure, but there is a risk that such scientists will
fall into the trap of dogmatism unless they listen
carefully to all scientiﬁc views before making
public pronouncements. Charisma should be
paired with humility, as I have seen cases in
which good scientists became overly conﬁdent of
their own expertise and Nature has proven them
wrong.
Other citizens learn by their own observa-
tions, and by oral traditions. Traditional knowl-
edge includes non-scientiﬁc explanations of the
natural world that may or may not have a basis in
physics or chemistry. For example, traditional
knowledge around some volcanoes that water
wells dry up before eruptions has a good physical
explanation. But other “knowledge” (belief) has
no physical explanation and is, instead, based on
religious faith. This group of citizens will be
equally or more convinced by traditional expla-
nations as by those from scientists. A good case
in point involved the late Mbah Marijan, spiritual
gatekeeper of Merapi, who was trusted by a
group of followers to know from conversations
with the spirits of Merapi whether their place
would be in danger or not (Schlehe 2010;
Donovan et al. 2012) and, more broadly, how
that augured for future national events (Dove
2010). Once differences in jargon are overcome,
social scientists can help physical scientists to
understand that the latter’s physical explanations
may or may not trump traditional knowledge.
Sixth, we have different resources and tools
at our disposal. Typically, scientists have
moderate to good resources for literature review,
gathering of new data, computing, and sharing
results through scientiﬁc meetings and publica-
tions. We may also have extensive experience
with other volcanic crises—something that is rare
for those with whom we work.
Engineers have resources for design and
implementation of structural measures—often
much more, in monetary terms, than resources of
scientists. This is a natural consequence of the
cost of such structural measures, and in most
cases is accepted as necessary. However, this
discrepancy between funding for science and
engineering intervention can become a sore
subject for scientists if engineers are not utilizing
the best available scientiﬁc information, and end
up wasting large amounts of money on structures
that scientists anticipate will not work. At Pina-
tubo, much money was spent on building woe-
fully inadequate sediment control structures
before engineering measures eventually grew
large enough to handle the threat (Janda et al.
1996). At Merapi, in retrospect, sediment control
structures actually caused pyroclastic flows to
jump out of stream channels and thereby
increased the death toll (Lube et al. 2011; Baxter
et al. in press).
Civil defence ofﬁcials, land managers, and
politicians typically have the authority and
resources to control public access to areas near a
volcano, to support an evacuation if needed and,
sometimes, to fund engineering intervention. In a
few countries, civil defence agencies provide
substantial funding to scientists and, in return,
can expect projects that address their very prac-
tical concerns. The news media have, by the
nature of their work, great communication
resources. They have the ear and the eye of the
public and, if they choose to do so, they can be
wonderfully effective in translating scientiﬁc
information into terms that others can use and
facilitating two-way communication with
scientists.
Citizens have only their own eyes and ears,
but often have the advantage of living on the
volcano and being able to spot changes that
escape modern instruments. A case in point is
that local farmers reported the start of the flank
eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in 2010 to police and
scientists, not vice versa (Bird and Gísladóttir
2012). A number of eruptions in remote areas
like the Aleutians are reported ﬁrst by airline
pilots who are constantly scanning their horizons
for any in-flight hazards.
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4 TRUST Between Scientists
and Non-scientists Is Critical
for Successful Risk Mitigation
Given the signiﬁcant cultural differences between
players in a volcanic crisis, there will inevitably
be scepticism and a period of adjustment before
each group is comfortable with the others. Per-
haps the biggest challenge is to develop trust
between the various players. More speciﬁcally,
trust between scientists and those who use sci-
entiﬁc information is essential if that information
is to be accepted and used (Paton 2007; Haynes
et al. 2008a, b; Donovan et al. 2014; Stone et al.
2014). Trying to understand and accept the cul-
tural differences among the various groups, and
involving users in the scientiﬁc process when-
ever feasible, are the best ways I know to
develop this trust. If the scientiﬁc team with an
ofﬁcial mandate for advice doesn’t reach out to
develop such trust, decision-makers may very
well look elsewhere for advice, including to
scientists perhaps less qualiﬁed but more com-
municative, or even to pseudoscientists who
seem to speak with authority.
Here are three examples where trust was
critical for volcanic risk mitigation.
4.1 Mount St. Helens 1980
Capsule timeline: March 20, 1980, earthquakes
start. March 27, ﬁrst phreatic eruption. More
phreatic eruptions and strong bulging of North
flank. Sunday, May 18, massive sector collapse
and laterally directed blast. Most forest workers
were off work on Sunday; most would-be tourists
had been kept out of the area but there was
access for some tourists along a myriad of small
logging roads. A lateral blast far larger than
expected led to 57 deaths.
Years of friendly interaction between geolo-
gists of the US Geological Survey (USGS) and
ofﬁcials of the US Forest Service (USFS) had
already establish good trust and credibility even
before the volcano became restless in 1980. An
excellent long-range hazard assessment had
already been published in 1978, albeit not pro-
moted or read as widely as it might have been.
Trust had also been developed over nearly a
decade of interaction between seismologists of
the University of Washington (UW) and a few
USGS seismologists who worked at the Univer-
sity, and that served as a good introduction
between the UW seismologists and other USGS
scientists who came quickly to Vancouver,
Washington.
As the crisis evolved, USGS and UW scien-
tists and USFS/State ofﬁcials grew to understand
and appreciate each other’s roles. Most of these
roles were never in doubt: scientists would try to
anticipate what the volcano might do; USFS and
State ofﬁcials would decide how to manage the
risk. Aside from a few early hiccups in which
ofﬁcials asked the USGS what they should do
and the USGS declined as a matter of agency
policy, these complementary roles were well
understood and accepted.
The USFS quickly established an Emergency
Coordination Center (ECC), where they provided
desks and phones for all of the other key parties
(State of Washington Emergency Services,
County Sheriffs, representatives of hydroelectric
and nuclear power utilities, major timber com-
panies). The Forest Service also organized daily
brieﬁngs for these representatives and for the
press. The ECC was great for building trust, as it
also afforded opportunities for 1:1 consultations
with the scientists about speciﬁc places, e.g., a
speciﬁc bridge, road intersection, etc., free from
the glare of TV cameras. Even before the giant
landslide and blast on May 18, 1980, trust
between scientists and USFS was strong.
The public, the news media, and the timber
companies clamoured for unrestricted access.
Fortunately for most, the USFS resisted and
declared a red zone off limits to all and a blue
zone with only limited access. Unfortunately, the
Governor of the State of Washington bowed to
political pressure and kept areas under her
jurisdiction ofﬁcially open. The Washington
State Patrol tried to block access anyway, but
Cultural Differences and the Importance of Trust … 7
couldn’t legally do so, and most fatalities in the
eruption occurred on land under State control
(Saarinen and Sell 1985).
After the landslide and blast, the shock of
events practically glued everyone together.
The USGS stationed two scientists at the ECC—
one as liaison between the scientiﬁc team and the
risk managers, and the other to provide consistent
information to the news media. I came to Mount
St. Helens not long after the landslide and blast,
as the liaison to risk managers, and worked
side-by-side for several years with USFS and
State personnel. Because we worked in the same
ofﬁce, shared the same coffee pot, and heard the
same conversations, we developed a mutual
understanding of each other’s needs and com-
petencies, even idiosyncracies. We learned to
“read” each other, and to learn from each other.
As mentioned above, USGS policy strictly
forbade scientists from suggesting to public
ofﬁcials how they should manage risk. Any rec-
ommendation regarding evacuations or other
mitigation measures contains an implicit assess-
ment of acceptable risk, including personal,
economic, and political matters well beyond the
expertise or mandate of scientists. In the US, the
public is staunchly, vehemently protective about
personal freedoms, including the right to make
most decisions about their own personal safety.
While private citizens might take recommenda-
tions or orders from land-managers and
law-enforcement, they certainly would not wish
for their freedom to be “managed” by scientists.
Recommendations about evacuations and other
mitigation are political matters, all agreed. Nev-
ertheless, there were times when Forest Service
or other risk managers struggled to understand
the hazard, and to decide on their response. In
those cases, because we trusted each other, we
held “off-the-record” conversations in which
scientists actually went beyond their ofﬁcial
limits to guide risk managers. We did not suggest
what ofﬁcials should do, but used personal risk
tolerance as bridge. The Forest Service staff
would ask us, “Would you personally stay in this
place, or would you let your own family stay in
this place?” Those were questions we could
answer without going beyond our brief, yet our
answers gave them the information they needed
to make their own decisions.
As another example, we struggled together to
reach a shared understanding of the magnitude of
remaining risk, using probabilities. The Forest
Service, timber companies, and loggers pushed
us to simplify the presentation and to make the
bottom line something that they could easily
understand. The result was a chart (“risk ladder”)
on which volcanic risk, once calculated, could be
compared at a glance to familiar risks (Fig. 1).
The chart includes occupational risks (soldier in
war, helicopter pilot, logger, ofﬁce worker, etc.),
lifestyle risks (lung cancer from smoking), and
accident risks (trafﬁc risks, risks from floods,
lightning strikes, etc.). Probabilities per se meant
almost nothing; locating one’s risk on this chart
made it instantly simple to decide whether a risk
was acceptable or not. None of the parties—the
timber company, loggers’ union, or Forest Ser-
vice—was concerned about high uncertainties or
about caveats in comparing voluntary and
involuntary risk.
Although the post-May 18 period had far less
threat and drama than that during and before May
18, trust and personal friendship that developed
in the course of working together has continued
to serve all parties well right up to the present,
including the 2004–2008 eruptive period.
4.2 Pinatubo 1991
Capsule timeline: July 16, 1990: M 7.8 strike-
slip earthquake with epicenter 100 km NE of
Pinatubo. April 2, 1991, phreatic explosions
along a ﬁssure across north-northeast flank of
Pinatubo. Fluctuating unrest until escalation in
early June. Extrusion of lava dome June 7–12.
Strong VEI 3 scale eruptions June 12–14. Cli-
mactic VEI 6 scale eruption and caldera for-
mation on June 15. Most of those at risk from
pyroclastic flows had been evacuated by June 14,
just barely in time.
Because Pinatubo had no historic eruptions,
ofﬁcials of Central Luzon had no established
relations or trust with Philippine scientists. There
was, however, a well-established relationship and
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trust between the National Disaster Coordinating
Council (civil defence, NDCC) and the Philip-
pine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology
(PHIVOLCS). Starting from the top, this rela-
tionship and trust was brought down to the
provincial and municipal levels. Initially, local
scepticism was extremely high, so trust at the
local level took a long time to develop, but a
combination of many brieﬁngs and increasingly
visible signs from the volcano itself eventually
turned the tide and allowed evacuation of the
riskiest areas before the eruption (Newhall and
Punongbayan 1996; Punongbayan et al. 1996;
Newhall and Solidum, this volume).
The slopes of Pinatubo were home to an
indigenous people, the Pinatubo Aytas. Centuries
of discrimination and distrust led most Aytas to
shun interaction with lowland Filipinos. Few of
the Aytas understood anything of modern sci-
ence, and most believed that Mount Pinatubo
was the home and domain of their god Apo
Namalyari, so anything that happened at Pina-
tubo would have to be explained as an action of
Apo Namalyari. A few of the responding PHI-
VOLCS scientists spoke Kapampangan or
Ilocano, languages familiar to all of the Ayta, but
none of the scientists spoke any of the Ayta
dialects, nor were there any longstanding rela-
tionships. Fortunately, there were several trusted
religious missions on Pinatubo—one of the
Franciscan Sisters of Mary northwest of the
summit, and two of evangelical Protestant mis-
sionaries north and south of the summit. The
communication gap between scientists and
indigenous Aytas was bridged by these trusted
missionaries.
Longstanding trust between USGS and PHI-
VOLCS scientists also helped greatly in this
crisis, and I suspect that it helped in the larger
task of developing trust and credibility with local
ofﬁcials. Had we scientists ourselves not been
completely uniﬁed, our task to dissolve ofﬁcial
and public scepticism and promote preparedness
could easily have foundered.
The matter of trust with commanders of the
US military bases was particularly complicated.
The Pinatubo crisis arose in the midst of a tense
renegotiation to extend the lease for US bases in
the Philippines, and there was little trust between
ofﬁcials of US military bases and those of the
Fig. 1 Risk ladder showing comparative annual risks to
life, in the US, circa 2000. Simpliﬁed and updated from
that originally used in Newhall (1982) to help loggers and
timber company managers understand volcanic risk they
faced in salvaging blown-down timber. Assuming good
volcano monitoring, communications, and willingness to
stop work during elevated volcanic unrest, the added
annual risk to each logger’s life was *0.0012/y (± one
order of magnitude), or approximately the same as a
logger’s normal occupational risk though with higher
uncertainty
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Philippine government. Initial warnings from
Philippine scientists were dismissed, and US
commanders only began to pay attention when
USGS scientists were invited in by PHIVOLCS.
Even then, scepticism remained high, as the US
scientists had to be conscious of their ﬁrst duty to
the Philippine government and populace. Grad-
ually, though, daily interactions and a growing
body of worrisome facts about the volcano dis-
solved scepticism one ofﬁcer at a time. The joint
PHIVOLCS-USGS team received critical logis-
tical support from the US military (especially, the
US Air Force), and the US military in return
received notices at the same time as Philippine
civil defence ofﬁcials, and had access to the
scientiﬁc team for additional discussions.
Two seemingly minor incidents at our make-
shift observatory on Clark Air Base greatly
improved trust and understanding of our mes-
sage. The ﬁrst was the anniversary of the big
eruption of Mount St. Helens, on May 18. After
working day and night since early April, the team
took a day off on May 18 to relax, and invited
military ofﬁcers over for a BBQ and beer. There,
we could talk about our families, fun, and matters
other than the volcano, and we noticed a palpable
improvement in relations with the military ofﬁ-
cers. They saw, for the ﬁrst time, that we scien-
tists were human and not much different from
themselves! We even had a sense of humour.
Amazing ☺
The other incident was soon thereafter, when
scientists started looking for a fall-back position
on Clark Air Base, as far from the volcano as
possible. The very fact that we were concerned
for our own safety in the middle of Clark Air
Base made the ofﬁcers take notice. Suddenly,
things we had discussed many times before,
including the possibility of pyroclastic flows
reaching Clark Air Base, took on new meaning.
On June 10, shortly after evacuation of most
personnel from Clark Air Base to Subic Naval
Station, the scientiﬁc team moved to the fallback
position at the far edge of Clark Air Base, and
some of the remaining military ofﬁcers moved
with the scientists.
4.3 Usu 2000
Capsule timeline: March 27, strong earthquake
swarm and pronounced ground fracturing
begins. March 31, explosive eruptions begin and
continue for *3 weeks while a cryptodome is
simultaneously being emplaced. The main haz-
ards were ballistic fragments, formation of new
craters, widespread ground fracturing, and hot
lahars. Timely evacuations kept everyone safe.
UsuVolcano, in Hokkaido, Japan, has a history
of explosive eruptions and cryptodome growth
over many centuries, most recently in 1910, 1943–
44, and 1977–1982. In those same crises, there
was unusually good trust between scientists,
police ofﬁcials, and mayors. In the case of 1910,
the police chief Mr. Iida had been a student of the
leading volcano and earthquake scientist of the
time, Prof. Omori at Univ. of Tokyo, so the contact
and respect was already established. The crisis of
1943–44 came during WW II, and scientiﬁc
response was led by another senior professor from
Univ. of Tokyo, Prof. T. Minakami. The post-
master, Mr. S. Mimatsu, was an amateur scientist
and worked closely with Prof. Minakami. (Mr.
Mimatsu’s son still maintains a volcano museum
near Usu).
After the 1943–44 eruption, tourist develop-
ment and population increased signiﬁcantly. Risk
at Usu arises because towns lie extraordinarily
close to the volcano, just 2–3 km from the
summit and even less from flank vents. For fear
of scaring away tourists, there was strong resis-
tance to discussion of volcanic hazards. How-
ever, Prof. Hiromu Okada had learned from
study of previous crises that the key to risk
mitigation had been trust and respect between
early scientists and police ofﬁcials. So, Prof.
Okada took on the personal challenge of frequent
interaction and trust-building with local ofﬁcials,
especially local mayors. He managed to change
the conversation from “Don’t mention volcanic
hazards!” to “OK, if we listen to the scientists,
educate the public, and back off briefly when
needed, we can safely co-exist with these vol-
canic hazards!” Mayor Okamura of Abuta town
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was an early convert. Prof. Okada’s personality
is excellent for building trust and, in 2000, when
another magma intrusion (cryptodome) was ris-
ing, people were safely evacuated ahead of
phreatic explosions that damaged many build-
ings. It was an outstandingly successful case of
volcanic risk mitigation in Japan.
5 Concluding Tips
When a volcano awakens, volcanologists and
other scientists will need to work with civil
defence leaders, politicians, business leaders,
engineers, news media and, sometimes, citizens.
Most scientists are not trained for such interac-
tion, and the interaction can be challenging. There
will be an initial period in which each group is
simply trying to get to know the other, and to
assess each other’s motives, technical compe-
tence, and judgment. Scientists will be under a
spotlight, since scientiﬁc information will become
a major factor in mitigation decisions.
Wide cultural differences exist between vol-
canologists and those who use volcanological
information, and these differences must be
understood and respected if there is to be trust
between both groups. How can this understand-
ing be achieved? The following tips are espe-
cially for volcanologists, but may apply as well
to other players.
• Work in close proximity as much as you can,
and try to understand each other’s culture and
needs. Volunteer to work side-by-side in
space organized by and for those needing
volcano information.
• Expect scepticism, and do not take it per-
sonally. Things that may signal obvious
danger to a scientist, e.g., a town built on a
pyroclastic flow deposit or unusual squiggles
on a seismogram, may not be at all obvious to
others, and the onus is on those who see
danger to convince others that it is real. Try to
relate it to what the audience knows and cares
about.
• Involve those who need volcano information
in the gathering and dissemination of that
information. Users become partners in the
scientiﬁc process.
• Be professional, patient, and show that you
want to help those at risk and those who must
make mitigation decisions. Without
pre-empting the decision maker’s responsi-
bility, share insights into your own personal
risk tolerance.
• Remember, we scientists may seem to be
from another planet. Bring humility and a
sense of humour to the table. Share personal
aspirations and worries, notes about families,
and other common interests, and food and
drink as well. Invite your counterparts out for
a beer, or a picnic, or birthday party, or make
any other simple, personal gestures to move
your interaction from strictly formal to space
in which you see the more human sides of
each other.
• Personal trust that grows out of such inter-
action is a critical prerequisite before ofﬁcials
will make the necessary, hard decisions for
mitigation.
• Once trust has been built, be careful to
maintain it. Obviously, correct forecasts will
build and maintain trust, but so, too, can
humility and honest statements of uncertainty
when we don’t know what the volcano will
do next.
In every interaction, professionalism,
cross-cultural sensitivity, and personal touches
make a powerful combination. Good luck!
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source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license
and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter
are included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license,
unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material.
If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license and your intended use is not permitted
by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you
will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright
holder.
Cultural Differences and the Importance of Trust … 13
